

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2248
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 AMMAN 3776

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR, JIDDA FOR CODEL JAVITS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (JAVITS, JACOB), PBOR, PGOV, JO, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: CODEL JAVITS--TALK WITH KING

1. CODEL JAVITS VISITED JORDAN FOR SIX HOURS JULY 6.
SENATOR MET WITH KING HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER BADRAN,
AND CROWN PRINCE HASSAN. THIS TELEGRAM COVERS MOST
SIGNIFICANT MEETING--KING HUSSEIN. SEPTTEL REPORTS
HIGHLIGHTS OTHER CONVERSATIONS. TELEGRAM NOT SEEN
BY CODEL AND SUBJECT TO THEIR COMMENT AND CORRECTION.
RECOMMEND, WITH CODEL APPROVAL, DEPARTMENT REPEAT
CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM.

2. SUMMARY: SENATOR'S ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH
KING FOCUSED ON AREA SITUATION, JORDANIAN ROLE IN
NEGOTIATION, AND SENATOR'S VIEWS ON AND REACTIONS
TO NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND ITS INTENTIONS.
ON AREA SITUATION BOTH AGREED TIME IS NOW RIGHT FOR
PEACE. ON JORDAN'S ROLE, KING SAID HE IS PREPARED
TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY, BUT LOOKS TO U.S. FOR
LEAD AND TO OTHER ARABS FOR SUPPORT. HE RECOGNIZES
WEST BANK IS A HEADACHE AND COULD BE A THREAT TO
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HIS FUTURE STABILITY AND TO HIS LIFE. HOWEVER,
HE IS WILLING TO MAKE NECESSARY SACRIFICES FOR PEACE
BUT IS NOT ABLE TO DO SO ALONE. SENATOR SAID NEW
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TRULY WILLING TO NEGOTIATE
AT GENEVA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS WHICH STANCE BEGIN
GOVERNMENT BELIEVES CAN RECONCILE WITH ITS PREVIOUSLY-
STATED POSITION ON THE WEST BANK. SENATOR SAID

BEGIN IS TOUGH, BEEN WAITING 30 YEARS TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER, AND IS NOT LIKELY TO BEND EASILY. ONE POSSIBLE FUTURE AREA OF HOPE IS FACT THAT JORDAN MIGHT PROVIDE NECESSARY CATALYST FOR MOVEMENT ON WEST BANK. WEIZMAN TALKS TOUGH, BUT BEING YOUNG MAY DEVELOP MORE FLEXIBILITY. DAYAN STILL PROUD OF HIS CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ARABS AND THIS MAY WELL BE LONGEST TERM INFLUENCE ON HIS CHARACTER. KING CONCLUDED, OBVIOUSLY WITH SOME RELUCTANCE, THAT ABOVE SKETCHES ONLY TENDED TO RECONFIRM HIS PRESENT VIEWS WHICH HE SAID, MOST EMPHATICALLY, WERE NOT PESSIMISTIC BUT ONLY AN ATTEMPT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH REALITY. END SUMMARY.

E. SENATOR JAVITS OPENED CONVERSATION BY RECALLING CONDITIONS WHICH CAUSED HIM TO MISS VISITING PRESIDENT ASAD IN DAMASCUS. HE ASKED KING IF HUSSEIN WISHED TO DO SO, TO SHARE HIS PRESENT CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ASAD.

4. SENATOR RECALLED CIA PRESS FLAP OF LAST FEBRUARY, NOTED THAT HE AND AMBASSADOR HAD DISCUSSED QUESTION, AND SAID HE WANTED TO REASSURE KING THAT IT HAD NOT AFFECTED HUSSEIN'S CREDIBILITY IN U.S. AND THAT HUSSEIN HAD HANDLED
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THE PROBLEM, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH DIGNITY AND SKILL.

5. SENATOR THEN EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF HIS VISIT NOTING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE HAD MADE PUBLIC SERIES OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. SENATOR JAVITS FELT THERE WAS ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW, A DIFFERENT THESIS, WHICH ALSO SHOULD BE SUPPLIED. HE HAD TALKED WITH PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR ADVISORS AND IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE VALUABLE FOR HIM TO VISIT THE AREA AND TO TRY TO PUT IT INTO FOCUS AS HE SAW IT FOR THE PRESIDENT. SENATOR SAID HE VALUED CHANCE FOR A VISIT AND NOTED THAT WITHOUT EXCEPTION EVERYONE IN THE AREA NOW AGREES THE TIME IS NOW RIGHT TO MOVE FOR PEACE. HE FOUND IN HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL UNANIMITY IN THE COUNTRY THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS ISRAEL COULD NOT GIVE UP THE WEST BANK AND SURVIVE AS A COUNTRY. SENATOR ADDED THAT AS A LAWYER HE KNEW THAT, WHATEVER THE FACTS, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THE WAY THE ISRAELI PEOPLE SAW THEM. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT IN THE WEST BANK IF IT WERE KING HUSSEIN NEGOT-

IATING RATHER THAN THE PLO HE THOUGHT TALK COULD TAKE PLACE
AND NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED ON A DIFFERENT BASIS.

6. SENATOR CONTINUED THAT KING COULD NOT DO IT BY
HIMSELF AND HE MUST HAVE A WAY OF GETTING INTO THE
ISSUE. HE EMPHASIZED HE DOES NOT NEGOTIATE
FOR THE U.S. EVEN THOUGH HE HAS CONFIDENCE OF
MANY SENIOR FIGURES. HE THEN STATED THAT HE HOPED
KING WAS AS READY TO MAKE THE EFFORT AS WERE THE PEOPLE
WHO ARE READY TO HELP HIM.

7. KING HUSSEIN IN REPLY WELCOMED THE SENATOR,
RECALLED THEIR VALUABLE PAST FRIENDSHIP, AND
SAID HE WANTED TO BE AS HONEST AS HE COULD.

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HE WAS WORRIED OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA
AND NOT SURPRISED AT THE SENATOR'S VISIT. HE
WOULD START AT THE END OF SENATOR'S REMARKS--HE

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HAD ALWAYS BEEN READY AND WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO DO
WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE
AND JUST PEACE. "IT IS THE ONLY AIM LEFT IN MY
LIFE."

8. HE THEN RECALLED RECENT PAST HISTORY, INCLUDING

EFFORTS MADE UP TO TIME OF RABAT SUMMIT, TO NEGOTIATE ON WEST BANK. ISSUE WAS STILL QUESTION OF TERRITORY OR PEACE. JORDAN KNEW THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT DIC-TATE TO ISRAEL. EGYPT'S GREATEST ERROR WAS IN THINKING IN SIMPLISTIC TERMS THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. HAD GREAT INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL AND THE AREA AND FROM HIS VISIT AND TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, HE WAS GRATIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION.

9. KING SAID HE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT ISRAELI ELECTIONS WERE PURELY OVER INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT SEEMED ISRAELI PEOPLE WERE UNITED ON TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS. THE HISTADRUT ELECTIONS LATER SHOWED LABOR WAS NOT IN ALL THAT MUCH DISFAVOR. "THERE IS A VERY TOUGH GROUP IN POWER NOW IN ISRAEL." ARABS HAD ALL HEARD ELECTION RHETORIC. KING HAD HOPED DAYAN COULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT IT SEEMED SECRET

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IN THE AFTERMATH OF HIS MISTAKES DUE TO OVERCON-VIDENCE IN THE 1973 WAR, DAYAN WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT.

10. IN THE OLD DAYS, THE U.S. USED TO JUSTIFY ARMING ISRAEL TO MAKE IT CONFIDENT AND MODERATE. NOW WE HAVE A TOUGH AND DETERMINED ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHICH TALKS OF THE WEST BANK AS "LIBERATED TERRITORY."

11. CONTINUING, THE KING NOTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A HEAD-ON CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S. WITH BEGIN RESPONDING BY USING FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A TACTIC TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE. LEBANON WAS A PERFECT SITUATION FOR THIS AND SYRIA WAS FRANKLY WORRIED. JORDAN'S WHOLE FRONTIER WAS EXPOSED. EGYPT IS TEETERING ECONOMICALLY AND THERE IS NOT MUCH WASHINGTON CAN DO TO SAVE IT. KING WANTED TO STATE MOST STRONGLY THAT HE DISLIKED INTENSELY THE TOSSING OF LABELS AROUND. EVERYBODY NOW SAID THAT HE WAS "PESSIMISTIC." HE RESENTED THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, INSISTING THAT HE WAS ONLY TRYING TO BE REALISTIC. KING THEN BRIEFLY REVIEWED SYRIA'S STABILIZING ROLE IN LEBANON AND NOTED

THAT THIS DEPRIVED SYRIA OF DEFENSIVE CAPACITY ON THE GOLAN.

12. TURNING AGAIN TO HIS OWN FUTURE ROLE, KING ASKED, "IS IT POSSIBLE TO KNOW THE END RESULT OF THE PROCESS

IN THE EYES OF THE U.S. AS OLD AND IMPARTIAL
FRIENDS? TO PLAY SOME ROLE WE NEED TO HAVE
SOME UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT." HE KNEW THAT PRESIDENT
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CARTER WAS STILL INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION
AND HAD NOT MADE ALL HIS DECISIONS. IN THE LONG
RUN, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION WAS BASICALLY
AN ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. HE RECOILED
FROM IMPOSING THE PLO ON THE PALESTINIANS AND
WOULD NOT AGREE TO DOING THIS IN ADVANCE. A
FAIR SOLUTION WOULD HAVE THE PALESTINIANS
CHOOSING THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP AND THE KIND OF
RELATIONSHIP THEY WANTED WITH JORDAN. THERE WERE
STILL CLOSE CULTURAL AND HISTORIC TIES
BETWEEN PEOPLE OF BOTH BANKS. "THIS IS AS FAR
AS I CAN GO AT THE PRESENT TIME." HE ADDED THAT
IF WE SEE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD WHAT THE U.S.
WANTS, WE CAN ASK THE PALESTINIANS TO CHOOSE WHAT
THEY REALLY DESIRE RATHER THAN HAVING SOMETHING
LIKE THE PLO IMPOSED ON THEM. THERE DOES NOT HAVE
TO BE A SETTLEMENT WHICH HANDS THE WEST BANK TO THE PLO.

13. AS AN OLD FRIEND OF THE U.S., JORDAN HAD
BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ALL OF THE ARAB PARTIES ABOUT
THE PLO. IT HAD ASKED THEM TO TAKE A MORE
CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE--FOR EXAMPLE TO SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT
THE QUESTION OF PEACE MEANS. THEY DID NOT HAVE

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TO SHOW THEIR CARDS IN ADVANCE, BUT THEY OUGHT TO THINK ABOUT THE MAJOR ISSUES--JERUSALEM, REFUGEES, THE NATURE OF PEACE, ETC.

14. SENATOR JAVITS THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. HE ACCEPTED FOR HIMSELF THE KING'S PERSONAL GOAL OF DOING WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE FOR PEACE. KING CONTINUES TO BE IMPORTANT CATALYST FOR MOVEMENT ON THE WEST BANK. EGYPTIAN ILLUSIONS REGARDING U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WERE WELL-FOUNDED. HOWEVER, U.S. WAS AND WILL BE MAJOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL. ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DO BUSINESS WITH THE PLO. FINALLY, A VISION OF THE OBJECTIVE WHICH THE KING HAS ASKED FOR SHOULD BE PROVIDED. IT MAY ONLY BE GIVEN TO THE KING AND A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF PEOPLE, BUT THE U.S. COULD NOT BE A SOLUTION WITHOUT JORDAN. THE SEANTOR ASKED, IF WE ASSUME THAT JORDAN PLAYS SUCH A ROLE AND THAT KING IS NOW SECURE IN THE EAST BANK, COULD JORDAN TAKE ON A ROLE REGARDING THE WEST BANK AND KING STILL PRESERVE HIS SECURITY AND STABILITY?

15. THE KING SAID HE AGREED THE WEST BANK WAS NO PRIZE AND INDEED WAS SERIOUS HEADACHE FOR HIM,
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BUT IF HIS ROLE WAS CRUCIAL HE WOULD NOT REFUSE TO TAKE THAT ROLE. MANY OF HIS PEOPLE AGREED THAT THE ROLE FOR HIM ON THE WEST BANK WAS NO BARGAIN AND OF NO ADVANTAGE.

16. THE SENATOR SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE KING'S VIEWS ON THIS POINT FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

17. THE KING TALKED ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO SYRIA, WHICH SHARED MANY OF HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT, AND HIS COMING TRIPS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT. SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND HE HOPED TO WIN THEM OVER TO HIS OWN POINT OF VIEW. FAHD HAD SOME FUNNY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PLO AND ITS ROLE.

18. SENATOR JAVITS SAID HE FELT THE SAUDIS WORE BIFOCALS AND LACKED DISTANT VISION ON THE MAJOR ISSUES.

19. THE KING ASKED THE SENATOR ABOUT HIS VIEWS
ON ISRAELI LEADERS. THE SENATOR SAID OVERALL
THEIR ATTITUDES WILL BE TEMPERED BY PUBLIC
RESTRAINT. BEGIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRIME MINISTER
30 YEARS AGO AND HAS LIVED WITH THAT THOUGHT EACH
DAY OF HIS LIFE FOR THE LAST 30 YEARS. HE WILL NOT
BEND, AT LEAST NOT EASILY. IN ANY NEW STATE
THE RADICALS USUALLY COME TO POWER EARLY AND
FALL EARLY OR MODIFY THEIR RADICALISM AND SUCCEED
FOR LONGER PERIODS OF TIME. NEVERTHELESS, BEGIN
MUST DEAL WITH THE U.S. HE CANNOT FIGHT A
WAR WITHOUT A GUARANTEE OF DEPENDABLE FUTURE
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SUPPLY. THIS MAY WELL RESTRAIN HIM ALTHOUGH
THE DESPARATION FACTOR OF COURSE CANNOT BE
REMOVED.

20. EZER WEIZMAN IS YOUNG AND TALKS TOUGH, BUT
BEING YOUNG HE MAY CHANGE. DAYAN IS STILL DAYAN
WITH HIS WORLD REPUTATION WHICH HE VALUES HIGHLY.
HE PRIDES HIMSELF ON BEING ABLE TO DEAL WITH
THE ARABS. ANY OLD POLITICAL CAMPAIGNER STICKS
WITH HIS WINNING TECHNIQUES AND WE MAY WELL FIND
DAYAN AGAIN PUSHING TO EXCEL IN HIS EFFORTS TO
DEAL WITH THE ARABS. "I BELIEVE HE WILL REVERT
TO THAT CHARACTER," THE SENATOR SAID.

21. THE KING SAID, SOMEWHAT WITH SOME FEELING,
THAT WHAT THE SENATOR HAD SAID HAD INDEED RECONFIRMED
EVERYTHING WE HAVE FELT.
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